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husband has in fact repudiated his trust or

obligation. 20
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Such a

burden would not seem to create a threat to the maintenance of the
family relation. However, where the wife's claim is to be subject
to the running of limitations, perhaps it would better serve the
policy of striving for domestic peace to require a clear showing of
repudiation by the husband.2 1
The protection of the family relation is a worthy policy; but,
when used in support of judicial determinations, it would seem to
stand as a statement of a conclusion only, leaving vacant the area
of discussion in which should fall the reasons why and the manner
by which the decision has in fact supported the stated policy. The
danger appears when "the protection of the family relation" becomes a mere shibboleth of the courts to be utilized perfunctorily in
engrafting judicial exemptions into the statute of limitations.
RoBERT

0. KLEPFER, JR.

Limitation of Actions-Equitable Remedies-Repudiation
In consideration of her husband's oral promise to convey to her
a one-half interest in land held in the husband's name, the wife
advanced him money for improvements.' Upon completion of the
improvements and in answer to his wife's request to put her name
on the deed, the husband replied: "'You don't think I am a damn
'0Further protection is afforded by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(9) (1953),
which provides that for relief based upon fraud or mistake the cause of
action is not deemed to have accrued until the aggrieved party has or should
have discovered such fraud or mistake. In addition, "... equity will deny
the right to assert that defense [running of limitations] when delay has
been induced by acts, representations, or conduct, the repudiation of which
would amount to a breach of good faith. ..." Nowell v. Great At. & Pac.
Tea Co., 250 N.C. 575, 579, 108 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1959) (defendant's promises to correct defects estopped him to plead limitations).
" In the rare case in which the husband has a claim based upon his
wife's failure to act, exemption of his claim from the running of limitations
would appear of little consequence, since whatever he gives his wife is
presumptively a gift. Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228
(1960); Shoe v. Hood, 251 N.C. 719, 725, 112 S.E.2d 543, 548 (1960). It
appears, therefore, that since lapse of time would decrease the possibilities
of overcoming the presumption, it is doubtful that the exemption would be
utilized.
'Fulp v. Fulp, 264 N.C. 20, 140 S.E.2d 708 (1965). It should be noted
that in North Carolina full performance by one of the parties to a contract
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds does not take the contract out
of the statute. Carter v. Carter, 182 N.C. 186, 108 S.E. 765 (1921).
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fool, do you?' "2 In a subsequent action by the wife to establish a
resulting or constructive trust, or in the alternative to recover her
money, this statement was held to constitute a repudiation of the
husband's agreement sufficient to start limitations running against
the wife. The North Carolina Supreme Court also held that the
wife's evidence was insufficient to establish either a resulting or a
constructive trust,3 and that her claim based upon contract implied
in law4 was barred by the three-year limitation statute.3 However,
the court conceded that "were plaintiff the cestui que trust of a
)30
resulting or constructive trust, the ten-year statute would apply ....
Both the logic of this distinction between quasi-contracts and
constructive trusts and the effectiveness of the husband's statement
as a repudiation would seem open to inquiry.
The broad concession by the court that the ten-year limitation
period applies in all constructive trust situations seems doubtful.
Of the three cases cited as support for the concession, one involved
a resulting trust ;7 one concerned an evidentiary problem and the
statute of limitations was not in issue;' and the third, in holding a
claim for breach of an express trust barred by limitations, stated
in dictum that the ten-year period is applicable to constructive
trusts.9
However, in an earlier case involving an action to set aside a
deed for fraud and undue influence and to impress a trust on the
property, it was stated that the ten-year statute did not apply because, "the alleged right to impress a trust upon the property is
dependent upon the validity or invalidity of the deed ...and if the
2264 N.C. at 22, 140 S.E.2d at 711.
'It would seem that the use of the wife's money in making improvements
on the land should not entitle her to hold her husband as constructive
trustee of the property since the money was not used in acquiring the
property. See generally 4 Scorr, TRusTs § 512 (2d ed. 1956).
'The court noted that, because of the confidential relationship, the wife
could have acquired an equitable lien on the property if her action had not

been barred. 264 N.C. at 25, 140 S.E.2d at 713.
The statute provides a three-year limitation period for actions "upon

a contract, obligation or liability arising out of a contract, express or im-

plied. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(1) (1953).
0264 N.C. at 26, 140 S.E.2d at 714. This statute is a catchall provision

providing that, "an action for relief not otherwise limited by this subchapter
may not be commenced more than ten years after the cause of action has
accrued." N.C. Gmq. STAT. § 1-56 (1953).
Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 84 S.E.2d 289 (1954).
8
Rochlin v. P.S. West Constr. Co., 234 N.C. 443, 67 S.E.2d 464 (1951).
' Teachey v. Gurley, 214 N.C. 288, 199 S.E. 83 (1938).
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right to assail this deed is barred by the statute, any and all claim
to the proceeds in the possession and control of defendants is also
barred."'"
More recently, a federal court, in applying North Carolina law,
came to the following conclusion:
A constructive trust is merely a procedural device by which a
court of equity may rectify certain wrongs. It is suggestive of
a power which a court of equity may exercise in an appropriate
case but it is not a designation of the cause of action which justifies an exercise of the power. .

. We find nothing in any

North Carolina decision suggesting that the courts of that state,
for purposes of limitations, classify a cause of action by reference
to the court's remedial power to grant redress. ....For purposes of limitations . .. the North Carolina court has looked
to the nature of the right of the litigant which calls for judicial
aid, not to the nature of the remedy to rectify the wrong.'1
These views, though in apparent conflict with the broad statement
in Fudp, would seem to reach the better result. As defined by
Professor Scott, "a constructive trust arises where a person who
holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to
another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he
were permitted to retain it. .. . The constructive trust is apparently established for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment
without regard to the intention of the parties; whereas the express resulting trust is established when circumstances raise an inference that
the settlor did not intend the person taking title to have the beneficial interest.3 The constructive trust should also be distinguished
from the equitable lien. The equitable lien entitles a defrauded party
to a charge on the property to the extent of funds traced there; the
constructive trust entitles him to the property itself.' 4
"0Little v. Bank of Wadesboro, 187 N.C. 1, 6, 121 S.E. 185, 188 (1924)
(dictum).
"iNew Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 301 F.2d 839, 842 (4th Cir. 1962).

" 4 Scorr, TRUSTS § 462 at 3103 (2d ed. 1956).
" See Avery v. Stewart, 136 N.C. 426, 434-35, 48 S.E. 775, 778 (1904).
1123 MINN. L. REv. 706 (1939). It was stated in Fulp that
the very essence of every real trust, express, resulting, or constructive,
is the existence of two estates in the same thing,-a legal estate vested
in the trustee, and an equitable estate held by the beneficiary. In an
equitable lien there is a legal estate with possession in one person, and
a special right over the thing held by another.
264 N.C. at 24, 140 S.E.2d at 712. Such a distinction appears doubtful.
Even though the beneficiary of a constructive trust has "some kind of an
equitable interest," his interest would appear not to be in all respects similar
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It would seem that the constructive trust is established on the
same general principles of unjust enrichment 5 that lie at the foundation of quasi-contract obligations and equitable liens, i.e., it
appears to be merely one of several remedial devices available for
relief in situations calling for restitution. 6 Whereas an action by the
beneficiary of an express trust is generally brought for the determination of interests, the cestui que trust of a constructive trust
is seeking a reconveyance founded, apparently, upon an implied-inlaw promise to reconvey. Consequently, since in all cases where a
party seeks restitution, whether by quasi-contract or by constructive
trust, the wronged party is generally required to assert some specific
ground, such as fraud or mistake, in order to recover,'17 it would
seem that this right asserted, not the remedy available, should be
determinative of the applicable limitation period. The same reasoning
would seem equally applicable to actions based upon contracts implied
in law."8 Such an emphasis upon substance rather than form would
seem to serve better the purposes of the statute of limitations as well
as avoid the anomaly of applying differing periods of limitation to
19
the same substantive wrong.
Cases may arise in which no underlying wrong is discernible.20
to the estate held by the beneficiary of an express trust. RESTATEMENT,
RESTITUTION § 160 (1937). See SCOTT, TRUSTS § 462.5 (2d ed. 1956).
"See Speight v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 209 N.C. 563, 183 S.E.
734 (1936).
" See Atkinson v. Atldnson, 225 N.C. 120, 33 S.E.2d 666 (1945). 4
SCOTT, TRUSTS § 461 (1956). See 12 N.C.L. REv. 400, 401 (1934). "He
is not compelled to convey the property because he is a constructive trustee;
it is because he can be compelled to convey it that he is a constructive
trustee."
4 ScoTT, op. cit. supra § 462, at 3103.
1
DAWSo N, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 117 (1951).
18 Such a rule is applied in Kansas. Orozem v. McNeill, 103 Kan. 429,
175 Pac. 633 (1918). Student Symposium on Statutes of Limitation in
Kansas, 9 KAN. L. REV. 179, 183 (1960). Contra, McFarlan v. Stillwater
County, 109 Mont. 544, 98 P.2d 321 (1940) (holding mistake of law to be
mere incident to action on implied contract). In North Carolina the same
limitation period would generally apply; but, for relief based upon fraud
or mistake the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until the
aggrieved party has or should have discovered such fraud or mistake.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(9) (1953).
19 "If restrictions are to be imposed on the remedy they should rest on
the grounds for awarding relief, not on the form the gains assume." DAWSON,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 23. It would seem arguable that where limitations
have run on the underlying wrong that the wrongdoer could not be said
to hold unjustly.
2 There remains an intractible group that cannot be classified in these
terms [of some specific wrong]. Among the quasi-contract cases there
are numerous decisions that rest on no more than the receipt of some
asset (usually money) that should have gone to the plaintiff. In some
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In such a situation, it would seem that either the three-year or the
ten-year statute might be applied. In either case, it would appear
to be the better rule to apply the same period to all actions founded
upon the same substantive grounds.
Another limitation problem is raised by the court's statement
that when a husband acquires possession of the separate property
of his wife, he is deemed to hold it in trust for her benefit.2" Since
no underlying wrong may be discernible in such a situation," it
becomes necessary to determine when the statute of limitations will
begin running against the wife on her action to enforce the trust.
In nontrust situations, where the claim is grounded not in fraud
or mistake, but in an unenforceable promise, the three-year statute
has been used.2"
The majority rule in regard to both resulting and express trusts
seems to be that limitations will run against the cestui que trust
only when the trustee has repudiated the trust to the knowledge of
the beneficiary.2 4 However, since the constructive trust is normally
founded upon an adverse holding from the beginning, it has been
of the constructive trust cases the equitable 'wrong' is so attenuated that
one can find only the conscience of equity at work, retrieving the gain.
DAWSON, op. cit. supra note 17, at 118.

21264 N.C. 20, 23, 140 S.E.2d 708, 711-12 (1965). By process of elimination, any such trust would appear to be a constructive trust since there
would appear to be a refutation of the mutual assent necessary for an
express trust. Neither would such a situation appear always to fall within
any of the resulting trust situations, i.e., failure of an express trust, full
performance of an express trust without exhausting the trust estate and
purchase of property by one person with conveyance to another at his
direction. See 4 SCOTT, TRUSTs § 404.1 (Zd ed. 1956).
" It would seem that, in lieu of proof of actual fraud, the wife might
make an argument for constructive fraud. Constructive fraud "rests upon
presumption arising from breach of fiduciary obligation rather than deception intentionally practiced." Miller v. First Nat'l Bank, 234 N.C. 309, 316,
67 S.E.2d 362, 367 (1951). However, the imposition of this doctrine seems
to have been limited to cases involving attorney and client, trustee and
beneficiary, mortgagor and mortgagee, guardian and ward, and principal

and agent. See McNeill v. McNeill, 223 N.C. 178, 25 S.E.2d 615 (1943).

"E.g., Dunn v. Brewer, 228 N.C. 43, 44 S.E.2d 353 (1947).
4Solon Lodge v. Ionic Lodge, 247 N.C. 310, 101 S.E.2d 8 (1957). 4
ScOTT, TRUSTS § 481.1 (1956). In Teachey v. Gurley 214 N.C. 288, 199 S.E.

83 (1938), it was held that where an express trust was based upon contract,

the three-year limitation period applicable to contract actions governed the
action to establish the trust, not the ten-year statute. The propriety of

extending this rule to all express trust situations seems questionable. Consideration is not required for the establishment of the trust and the trustee
by accepting the trust does not make a contract to perform the trust enforceable in an action at law. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 197 (1959).
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suggested that limitations should run immediately with no requirement of repudiation.25 Nevertheless, where the wife is beneficiary
of a constructive trust and has no reason to believe the trusteehusband is holding adversely to her, it would seem that limitations
would not run until repudiation.2"
Statements concerning the requisites for a finding of repudiation
have generally appeared in cases involving alleged anticipatory
breaches." In such situations, the established guidelines appear to
be that the repudiation need not be written; but it must be unequivocal, positive, distinct, absolute, inconsistent with the existence
of the contract, and accepted by the adverse party as a repudiation.2
Applying such a standard to the husband's statement-"You don't
think I am a damn fool, do you?"-it would seem doubtful that
there had in fact been a repudiation.
In Fulp the parties were not dealing at arm's length. Although
the husband's failure to convey after full payment and demand had
been made by the wife might be considered an avoidance of the
express oral contract,2 9 the controlling question would still appear
to be whether the husband had so repudiated his agreement that the
wife was chargeable with knowledge of his adverse holding of
her money. The husband's subsequent statements of intention to
convey at a future time would therefore seem relevant not only
on the question of estoppel, 30 but also on the question of repudiation.
Consideration of the relationship of the parties would seem to
" 18 U. CiNc. L. Rv.230, 231 (1949).
2 See Mclnnes v. Mclnnes, 163 Md. 303, 163 At. 85 (1932) (applying
doctrine of laches); Opp. v. Boggs, 121 Mont. 131, 193 P.2d 379 (1948).
"Thus where A conveys land to B who orally agrees to reconvey it to A,
and B is in a confidential relation to A, B holds the property upon a constructive trust for A. In such a case A is not guilty of laches in failing
to sue as long as B has not repudiated his promise." 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS §
481.1 at 3152 (2d ed. "1956).
"'
See Edwards v. Proctor, 173 N.C. 41, 91 S.E. 584 (1917).
8

Ibid. The requirement that the repudiation must be accepted as such
by the injured party seems proper since there is the possibility of retraction
so long as no substantial change of position has intervened. See 4 CoanIN,
CONTRAcTS § 981 (1951).
"In North Carolina oral contracts for the conveyance of land are
not void, but voidable merely at the instance of the party to be charged.
Durham Consol. Land & Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N.C. 381, 384,
21 S.E. 952, 953 (1895). 30 N.C.L. REv. 292 (1952).
30 See Nowell v. The Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 250 N.C. 575, 108
S.E.2d 889 (1959). The husband had replied to repeated requests to convey,
"'Oh, we'll do that later.., we will, but let's go ahead with it."' 264 N.C.
20, 22, 140 S.E.2d 708, 711.
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require that on the equitable claim for money had and received
limitations should not commence running until the husband clearly
and unequivocally repudiates his agreement.
ROBERT O. KLEPFER, JR.

Patents-Section 103 Obviousness as a Time-bar Under
Section 102(b)
The Congress shall have Power ....
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ....1
This is the constitutional basis of the United States patent system.
In 1790 the first patent act was enacted by Congress,2 to be followed
by others, each growing in complexity. For a patent to issue, it was
necessary that an "invention" be useful, new or novel, and an
invention. Typical of these acts was the act of 1870 which provided
that "any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof. .

. ."'

was entitled to a patent.

A great body of decisional law was developed as the courts attempted to define "invention," but as was pointed out by the Supreme
Court,4 "invention" cannot be defined. In recognition of the indefinableness of invention, affirmative rules were developed to aid
the courts in determining the presence of invention as were negative
rules to indicate the lack thereof.' But these rules did not definitively establish either the presence or lack of invention in fact. In
'U.S.
2

CONsT.

art. I, § 8.

Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109.
Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 201, reenacted, REv.

(1875).

STAT.

§ 4886

'McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891).
' Examples of the affirmative rules are the long-felt want for the invention; successful efforts on the part of the inventor over unsuccessful
efforts by those skilled in the art; commercial success of the invention;
imitation by others; new or unexpected results; turning a halt in the art
into progress; and solutions to an outstanding unsolved problem. Some
examples of the negative rules are the mere exercise of skill expected of a
person having ordinary skill in the art; substitution of materials or elements; reversal of parts; and change in size, shape or form. 2 DELLmR,
DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 106 at 75 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as DELLER].

